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Summary:
The study on which this paper is based, examines the impact of some of the
internal attributes of MNC's (e.g., ownership, size, level of technology used, etc.)
on the MNC-host country relationships in six developing countries. This paper in
particular examines the influences of the management orientations, strategies, and
philsophies in coping with the changing environmental demands in the host countries.
The study was undertaken in one hundred and twenty-four multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) (fifty-four American, forty-three European, and twenty-seven Japanese),
operating in six developing countries: Brazil, India, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore,
and Thailand.
The results show that the three types of MNCs are not only different in their
orientations, but also differ in their basic investment strategies in dealing with
the governments, employees, and other clientage groups in host countries, and in
their modes of resolving conflicts in these countries.
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Adaptability of the American, European, and Japanese
Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the management strategies,
philosophies, and orientations of American, European, and Japanese
multinational corporations (MNCs) in coping with the increasing demands
of the host, particularly in the developing countries.
In recent years, MNCs have come under considerable scrutiny by both
the home and host countries, as well as by the international bodies,
such as the United Nations and the International Labor Organizations.
In their home countries, they have been criticized for exporting
jobs, creating balance of payment problems, and making it difficult for
the national government to' Implement foreign policies.
In the host countries, they have been attacked for exploiting labor,
using monopolistic power to crush the local firms, being involved in
"unethical" transfer pricing practices, and using leverage to gain
favorable rates for large financial credits from local capital markets.
At the same time, they have been questioned by the host nations
about their specific contributions to the socio-economic plans of the
host countries. In more specific terms, many of the developing countries,
in order to maximize their returns from foreign private investment,
have enacted legislation which requires a majority local equity in
foreign enterprises, higher proportion of local nationals in top posi-
tions, and Increased exports and foreign exchange earnings and reduction
of imports of raw material and spare parts.
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Such demands from the host countries have to some extent con-
strained the MNCs to rationalize the world-wide productive capacity
they seem to possess. For this purpose, MNCs, on their part, have
made demands on the host countries to provide them with efficient
infrastructural facilities, reduce bureaucratic controls and inter-
ference in corporate affairs, provide conducive labor legislations,
and more flexible expansion policies.
COMPARATIVE FOCUS
Generally speaking, the host countries have attempted to apply
uniform and non-discriminatory regulations on the multinational cor-
porations originating from the different countries. That is, American,
European, and Japanese multinationals, for example, are not being
treated differently, policy-wise, by the host nations. However, in
spite of apparent similarities of regulations and controls, MNCs from
different countries have interpreted and responded to such regulations
in different modes.
It was the purpose of this study, therefore, to examine the simi-
larities and differences among American, European, and Japanese MNCs'
strategies, philosophies, and orientations in coping with the controls
and regulatory measures imposed on them by the host country. To exa-
mine such similarities and differences, we began at the beginning by
asking questions concerning the nature of the conflicting issues and
causes and consequences of the conflicts between the MNCs and the host
governments and other publics in the host countries.*
*For the sake of brevity, henceforth we will refer to conflicts among
the MNCs and the host governments and the other publics in the host
countries as MNCs-environmental-unit conflict in the host country.

-3-
CONCEPTUAL SCHEME, RESEARCH SETTINGS, SAMPLE, AND METHOD
Initially, as shown in Figure 1, the research model postulated
that the nature and intensity of the conflict between the MNCs and
the environment units in the host country, may be a function of cer-
tain internal attributes of the MNCs (such as ownership, size, type
of industry, years of operation in the host nation, level of capital
investment, level of technology used, and pattern of equity holding
in the subsidiary by the parent organization) and certain attributes
of the host nations themselves (such as level of industrial and eco-
nomic development, and socio-economic and political stability and
diversity)
.
The research was conducted in six developing countries: Brazil,
India, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and Thailand. Senior executives of
124 MNCs operating in those countries were interviewed with the aid
of a semi-structured interview guide.
We also interviewed senior government officials, executives of
the trade and professional associations, banking and investment com-
panies concerned with foreign investment, and other knowledgeable
persons in those countries to collect background information and to
obtain the perspectives and viewpoints of those persons on the multi-
national activities in those countries.
Thus far, our attempts have been concentrated on examining the
impact of certain internal attributes of MNCs on MNC-host country rela-
tionships. An analysis of results of this aspect is reported elsewhere.*
These results are briefly summarized below.
*See Anant R. Negandhi with B. R. Baliga Quest for Survival and Growth:
A Comparative Study of American, European, and Japanese Multinationals
(W. Germany) Athenaeum Verlag
>
1979 and Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979,
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BRIEF SUMMARY OF RESULTS
1. American and European MNCs tend to have a larger number of
interface conflicts in the host countries than the Japanese
MNCs.
2. Japanese MNCs tend to have more operational problems than the
European and American MNCs.
3. Wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidiaries tend to have more
interface conflicts than the minority-owned subsidiaries.
4. Firms operating in a seller's market and a moderately competi-
tive market, tend to have a large number of interface conflicts
than those operating in competitive markets.
5. MNCs with larger expectation differences between themselves and
the host governments face more interface conflicts than those
with smaller expectation differences.
6. The type of industry, number of years in operation, size of
employee force, level of capital investment, level of tech-
nology used, and extent of product diversification did not
make significant impact on the MNCs host-country relationships.
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the
impact of managerial strategies, philosophies, and orientations on the
MNCs' host-country relationships. The following discussion on this
aspect is based on the in-depth interviews with the senior executives
of 124 MNCs (subsidiaries) and the governmental officials and other
knowledgeable persons in those six countries studied.
MNC-MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS
As researchers, our bias was clearly in favor of quantifiable
factors, but we were not blind to Oscar Wilde's observations that,
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"A cynic is a man who knows the price of everything, and
the value of nothing." (Nowotny, 1964)
Or to put it differently, as the thoughtful businessman Nowotny reminds
us:
"We tend to put everything in life in quantifiable 'fact'
and/or non-quantifiable 'value 1 terms. We have done so since
the beginning of human history, and it is improbable that this
dual way of looking at things will ever be replaced by a purely
factual approach which eliminates all value judgments." (1964:101)
Nowotny goes on to say,
"Top executives, like all other people, will continue to base
their decisions on so-called objective facts, on the one hand, and
subjective values, commonly referred to as management or business
philosophy, on the other hand...Value judgments will usually have
priority over factual considerations in making vital business deci-
sions." (1964:101)
During the last two decades or so, much has been written about
differences in management orientations of managers from different coun-
tries. The U.S. managerial orientation, for example, has been charac-
terized as aggressive, egalitarian, and conscious of human relations.
In contrast, the European managerial orientation has been characterized
as authoritarian, passive, and paternalistic (Nowotny, 1964). Finally,
Japanese management, has been described as paternalistic, culture-bound,
and secretive. (Yoshino, 1968)
Nowotny, among others, has argued that in terms of managerial
philosophy, the American management is future-oriented, aggressive,
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mobile, informal, quantity-conscious, and organization-minded, while
European management is past- and present-oriented, values wisdom over
vitality, stability over mobility, convention over informality, quality
rather than quantity, and diversity over organization. (1964)
Although much cross-fertilization has taken place, not only be-
tween Americans and Europeans, but also between managers in developed
and developing countries, our observations indicate that subtle but
noticeable differences still exist between the three groups of multi-
nationals under consideration—American, European, and Japanese. We
found that these differences were quite evident in their management
philosophy and approaches to dealing with host governments and other
environmental units. They not only utilized different investment
strategies, but also had different objectives in investing abroad.
The host governments, on their part, also recognized differences in
the actions and behavior of these multinationals. Some of these dif-
ferences are elaborated on below.
COMPANY EFFICIENCY VERSUS SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
In general, the U.S. multinationals studied seem to be operating
with a notion of efficiency which is different from that held by their
European and Japanese counterparts. To American managers, the cardinal
principle of efficiency was the profitable production of quality goods
and services at a price the consumer could afford or was willing to
pay. This notion was continually reinforced by the home office, which
rewarded the subsidiary on the basis of its annual bottom-line perfor-
mance. Thus, plant productivity, cost of goods purchased, and similar
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financial indices became the main concerns of the overseas manager.
The very legitimacy of overseas operations and their subsequent worth
was seen in terms of operational efficiency.
In contrast, the Japanese and Europeans measured success or failure
not so much in terms of the operational efficiency criteria used by
American multinationals, but in terms of system effectiveness, i.e.,
the degree to which their organization was able to adapt to and cope
with the stimuli (e.g., new control or regulatory mechanisms) emanating
from the environment. In order to do so, they were often willing to
sacrifice some short-term operational efficiency. Furthermore, the
home-office often reinforced the policy of long-term effectiveness by
stationing an expatriate manager in one country for substantial periods
of time. His role was evaluated, not so much in terms of bottom-line
profits, as in terms of the ability to cultivate and maintain a harmo-
nious interaction with host-government officials and others in the
environment. In contrast, most U.S. executives perceived such activ-
ities as a "waste of resources," contributing only to a decrease in
efficiency and profitability. In fact, U.S. subsidiary managers were
rarely asked by the parent organization to cultivate interface and
boundary relationships.
With respect to the short-term profit orientation of American
multinationals, the managing director of an American subsidiary, a
local national, said:
"Americans are interested in taking out their investments In
five years and are then willing to let the company decline and die...
(They) develop a habit of walking out from a given market at the
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slightest provocation. They are too temperamental and don't give a
damn about understanding host countries' problems and aspirations.
What they want is their fair return. . .their ability to get back
their investments in five years, and then remit profits to the maxi-
mum extent possible."
A European executive in Southeast Asia expressed a similar viewpoint.
"Americans come here on a temporary basis and set up fly-by-
night type of operations, and they disappear as fast as they come.
We do not come with such intentions. Because of this American
attitude, they (U.S. executives) get very annoyed when the govern-
ment changes policies. We, too, do not like sudden changes in
policies, but this is the name of the game and one should adapt to
it." (See also Franko, 1976:225 for similar observations.)
We also observed that European and Japanese executives were given
enough leeway and freedom to set their own targets in a given country,
while U.S. subsidiary executives were programmed by their headquarters
to produce, sell, and make profits at certain levels.
As the managing director of a large American petroleum company
lamented,
"Those computer kids in New York, tell us what to do, when
to eat, and when to travel. We have no freedom like the Japanese
and Europeans.. .They must be paid half as much, but carry a lot
of decision-making power."
Another characteristic displayed by U.S. executives was their mis-
guided notion that they were doing the host nations a big favor by
their very presence. If the host nations did not appreciate this fact,
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they said they would be only too glad to leave, and gleefully watch the
nation's downfall. The following quotations from our interviews pro-
vide further insights into the workings of the U.S. overseas executive's
mind.
The managing director of a large American MNC in Malaysia, pounding
his hand on the desk, said,
"We came here because they needed us. We can help them.
This little country and her little people need help, but they
must be reasonable, otherwise we will get out of here."
Commenting on the status of his own company, he said,
"We are number one in the world in the manufacturing of
,
and I want you to know, and the world to know about
this fact, and I want you to tell this to everybody else."
In contrast, a European MNC's executive reflected,
"We came here to stay for a long time. We have been here
a long time, and intend to stay unless ordered out by the host
country. Of course, then we must go... We are, after all, their
guests."
Franko, in his study of European multinational companies, under-
scored this highly-adaptable attitude of European MNCs in these words,
"The continental presence was more discreet.. .the flags of
the home countries of continental enterprises did not connote
ambitious or superpower capabilities of recipient countries."
(1976:222)
The Japanese multinationals' overall attitude toward host nations
was even more conciliatory than that of the Americans and Europeans.
The overall Japanese view was,
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"We came here as guests, and our nation is small and needs
natural resources, as well as foreign trade and investment to
survive."
Japanese multinationals generally emphasized their role in contri-
buting to the overall welfare of their host and home countries. They
seem to believe that each and every one of them has a national respon-
sibility to secure resources for Japan, to provide opportunities for
small manufacturers from Japan to invest overseas, to sell their
advanced technology, and to help host nations achieve their own socio-
economic objectives. Of course, such a "collective" orientation, in
contrast to the "individualistic" orientation of the U.S. executive,
strongly reflects Japan's national heritage and religious beliefs.
(Kitagawa, 1976:21)
Whether such differences between Americans, Europeans, and Japanese
are substantial or not, government officials and opinion leaders
(press, academicians) in the countries studied, perceived the existence
of such differences. A high-ranking government official in Singapore,
a country very cordial to the United States, said,
"Americans are more jumpy, impulsive, and reactive, while
Europeans are very conservative and go with a step-by-step approach
in decision making. . .Europeans come here to stay, and Americans
come on a short-term basis."
Not surprisingly, this attitude was apparent in the MNC's invest-
ment strategy, reaction to changes in host-government policies, and
the selection and training of overseas managers. This is examined in
greater detail in the following section.
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ADAPTIVE VERSUS REACTIVE BEHAVIOR
Generally speaking, U.S. multinational executives perceived policy
changes in host countries as a substantial threat to their operations.
Their usual reaction to change was belligerent. Instead of negotiating
discreetly, they preferred to over-react and ignore diplomacy. In the
majority of cases, they failed to distinguish between an actual govern-
mental policy change, and merely apparent shifts in the host government's
attitude adopted only in order to placate political factions within a
nation. In certain cases, U.S. MNCs precipitated policy changes through
reacting prematurely to inconsequential statements made by the host
government's representatives.
In contrast, the Japanese generally saw the source of their prob-
lems with host governments in actions taken by third parties. . .students,
organized labor, consumer groups, and even American multinationals.
During times of conflict, they assumed a very low profile and waited
for the tension to dissipate.
European executives generally assumed a "philosophical" position
on any issue that arose. They blamed neither the government (as
Americans did) , nor other publics (as the Japanese did) . They were
generally charitable to American MNCs facing specific problems with
the host country. In brief, they preferred to stay on the sidelines,
and were very willing to compromise. As a Swiss executive in Brazil
explained,
"MNCs should operate within the framework of Eastern philo-
sophies: no public debate, no press releases, no big announcements,
no big fanfare, just do the job... (They should) follow the example
of the Hindu Atma and get lost; lose identity into nothingness."
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He went on to recommend,
"...a philosophy of harmony and cooperation instead of raising
issues..., keeping a low profile, asking no questions, and working
within host-government policies, and solving problems at a personal
level, rather than at the public level."
Similarly, a European executive in Malaysia, referring to a sudden
change in that country's investment policies (requiring that a fixed
proportion of employees be "Bhumiputras") said,
"The government goals and objectives do change, and we must
adapt to these changes. This is what international business is
all about; we must constantly adapt to new circumstances, and
nobody can say that the government has to keep its goals and
policies the same for all time."
With reference to the same policy change, an American executive
reacted by saying,
"The recent two acts are unconstitutional and amount to
illegal takeover of foreign companies. (The government) is
tyrannical, and no different from that in other developing
countries. . .1 will not advise my company to invest any more in
Malaysia."
Such differences in MNC-behavior patterns and reactions were
further revealed through examining the perceived intensity of con-
flicts, the consequences of conflicts, and the extent of the involve-
ment of senior executives in these episodes.
Table 1 shows that of all the conflicts faced by American MNCs,
45 percent were described by their executives as very intense. On the
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Table 1
Intensity of Conflict by Origin of Controlling Ownership of MNC
OWNERSHIP
INTENSITY OF CONFLICT
HIGH MEDIUM LOW
U.S.
EUROPEAN
JAPANESE
N % N % N %
10/45 17/41 7/14
13/40 12/34 9/26
6/21 6/21 11/48
Source: Authors' interviews as reported in Negandhi-Baliga
Quest for Survival and Growth, p. 47.
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other hand, only 14 percent of conflicts were rated as less Intensive
by the U.S. executives. The European MNCs were not far behind: 40
percent of their conflicts were described as highly intensive. How-
ever, the Japanese MNCs noticeably played down the intensity of their
conflicts in the host countries. Only 21 percent of their conflicts
were evaluated as highly intensive.
The low-profile strategy adopted by the Europeans and Japanese had
favorable payoffs in terms of the ultimate consequences of the conflicts.
American MNCs had twice as many breakdowns in relationships than the
Europeans, and three times more than the Japanese. Apparently, Europeans
and Japanese prevented their conflicts from ending in dire consequences.
(Franko, 1976; Boddewyn, et al. , 1972; Heller, et al. , 1975)
The Japanese MNCs' desire to maintain a low profile is further
shown by the relative lack of direct involvement in any conflicts of
their senior personnel. Approximately half of the U.S. and European
MNCs' conflicts involved senior personnel, whereas in Japanese MNCs,
junior- and middle-level executives took the heat. This strategy
could be followed largely because of the fact (as shown in a latter
section) that Japanese firms filled even lower-level managerial posi-
tions with Japanese expatriates.
MANAGERIAL ATTRIBUTES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In their responses to our question, "What talents do you consider
are most needed by the executive-personnel dealing with host govern-
ments?" all MNC-executives interviewed seemed pretty much in agreement.
They all ranked inter-personal competence and influential contacts as
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most desirable qualities. In addition, the Japanese MNCs placed major
emphasis on the "political" and diplomatic skills of their executives.
The American, European, and Japanese executives, however, differed
considerably in applying their resources to conflict resolution. The
American approach, in most cases, was to place all their cards on the
table, and to attempt to resolve their problems in public. They
appeared to be under the impression that their interests would be best
served through a general and open discussion of the issues involved.
They tried to generate such a dialogue through press releases, and by
pressuring government officials independently, through industry asso-
ciations, or even through U.S. Embassies and Consulates.
A European executive in Brazil commented on this approach, and
contrasted it with his own (European) approach, thus:
"The American way of bringing things out into the open... is
stupid. What do they achieve? We do not understand the American
way... The company should be careful not to raise any dialogue or
do anything via debate... I would suggest complete secrecy and
solving problems discreetly at the personal level."
Another European executive in Malaysia expressed similar thoughts:
"Americans get into conflict with government. . .this is the
American way of life. They do not like governments to tell them
what to do, and they get on right away (in debate) with the govern-
ment officials and fight if the officials attempt to control them.
This may be the life style in America, and they are used to this
life style... and think it applies equally here (in host nations)."
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The host-government officials also perceived Americans as aggres-
sive and far too vocal. A Brazilian government official, for example,
stated,
"Americans bring out everything in public...We do not under-
stand it. It is okay philosophically, but washing dirty linen in
public does not solve anything. . .We do not understand the American
way."
In contrast, both European and Japanese executives were adept at
keeping a low profile, and did their best not to raise questions in
public. They preferred to work discreetly and make very subtle efforts
to influence decision-makers. In times of stress, they (especially
Japanese) did not hesitate to push their "big brothers" (U.S. MNCs)
into the limelight, taking shelter in their shadows.
RESPONSES TO POLICY CHANGES
Substantial differences between the three groups of MNCs were
clearly reflected in their responses to specific issues and policy
changes that were being debated at the time our study was carried out.
We examined three policy changes that were announced recently in three
countries—Malaysia, India, and Peru—in order to illustrate these
differences.
MALAYSIAN CASE
The Malaysian Government now requires all foreign corporations to
increase equity holdings by nationals and also specifies proportions
in which various ethnic groups are to be employed in an organization.
The required percentages are: 30% Chinese, Indian, and those of other
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national origins who are Malaysian citizens; 40% Bhuraiputras , who are
considered to be the "true" Malaysians; and 30% foreigners (expatriates).
To implement this policy, the government has formed a ministerial-
level committee, which has begun to issue letters of invitation to
various foreign companies to appear before the committee and discuss
their plans for compliance with the stated policy.
In response to the question, "What would you do if you get a letter
of invitation from the committee?" the typical answer of Japanese MNCs
was:
"We have already done so and implemented this policy of the
government in terms of equity requirements, and will attempt to do
the same with respect to the employment of the different national
groups. Of course, this is somewhat difficult, and time-consuming,
but the government understands our problems and is sympathetic."
The European response was:
"Fine! We have already made plans and look forward to dis-
cussing intelligently with the government officials; we are not
scared or afraid; we will make every effort to implement this
policy."
In commenting on the fairness of this Malaysian policy, a European
expatriate manager echoed this reaction, saying:
"The government policy of Malayization is correct. And as a
matter of fact, they are trying to tell us: 'look, MNCs, we like
you and would very much like your operation here, but we have this
problem of inequity which may create troubles and a potential
revolution. This Is not good for you or us... 1 , we do not need
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revolutions, but to avoid this, we must get down to work and remove
this inequity; otherwise, neither you nor we will be here... (To us)
this is a realistic situation, and we are prepared to work with the
government."
In contrast, an American executive's reaction to the same policy
was:
"These policies are political in nature and will and should
not be implemented; but if they are, it will hurt the country and
the inflow of foreign investment."
The American executive's response was to make a long-distance call
to the vice-president of the international division of his company,
and then fly home for detailed Instructions. The majority of the
American expatriate managers interviewed felt that the policy was un-
constitutional, and that they would rather pull out than implement it.
In reality, however, neither the Japanese nor the European MNCs in
Malaysia had made any serious efforts to Increase the employment of
"Bhumiputras" in the proportions desired by the government. American
MNCs, on the other hand, had a higher proportion of locals on their
employee rosters. As we will see in a later section, Europeans and
Japanese have been relatively slow in placing local nationals in top-
level positions, not only in Malaysia, but also in other developing
countries.
Further, American MNCs have shown the greatest reluctance in
complying with equity-dilution requirements, while the Europeans and
Japanese have demonstrated a greater flexibility in doing so. (Franko,
1976). The American refusal to do so appears to have placed them in an
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awkward position, which the host-government officials have variously
attributed to "American stubbornness, inflexibility, imperialism, and
indecisiveness."
THE INDIAN CASE
Analogous to the Malaysian case, the Government of India's Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973, requires that all foreign
equity holdings be diluted to 40%, unless the firm is operating in the
"priority sector" designated from time to time by the government,
and/or the firm is exporting at least 65% of its production.
Here again, the typical response of European MNCs was to either
increase their exports to the required amount, dilute their equity,
and/or to increase investments in the "priority sectors." It was
interesting to note, for example, that a well-established European
tobacco company (a non-priority industry), sought the advice of an
Indian consulting firm in order to find ways and means of investing
its large accumulated capital in cement manufacturing. When we asked
some American executives about this move by the European company, the
majority of them felt that the company was "out of its mind." The
Americans also felt that if they were to recommend to their home office
Investment in some unrelated but priority industry, they would be imme-
diately fired or called home and demoted. They, accordingly, spoke
more in terms of pulling out of India, or exerting pressure on the
Indian Government through the U.S. State Department and other U.S. and
international agencies.*
*Two recent cases of IBM and Coca Cola's withdrawals from India
exemplify our above point.
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THE PERUVIAN CASE
Similar reactions were observed in Peru with respect to the Andean
Pact Regulations, particularly "Decision 24," which requires all
foreign companies to become "mixed companies" with 51% local ownership
within 15 years. (Council of the Americas, 1973) The typical European
and Japanese response to this regulation was,
"We will do it when the time comes," or "We have already done
so."
The Americans frequently talked about leaving or putting pressure
on the Peruvian and other Andean Pact countries to change the Andean
pact regulations.
DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION
Our extensive interviews further confirmed the fact that the
examples described above were not unique. A detailed analysis of the
conflict-response patterns led us to believe that in interpreting
government policies, the Japanese managers were inclined to follow
what they called "political Instructions" which were communicated
orally by government officials or reported in the press, regardless
of whether such instructions were spelled out in the policy framework
or not. In contrast, the American tendency was to refer to the docu-
mentations of policies, and act accordingly. The usual reasoning of
American MNCs seemed simple and straightforward. "If the governmental
policies are favorable to our company's overall interests, we will
come (forward to invest) and continue our operations; if they are not,
we will not (come forward to invest) and pull out our existing invest-
ments." The actions of American petroleum companies in India and
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Malaysia amply illustrate this attitude. In India, one company decided
to withdraw its investment in petroleum refining and marketing opera-
tions when the Government of India began to implement its petroleum
policy of increasing the market-share of the public-sector companies.
In Malaysia, when the Government announced its interim royalty rate
(7-1/2% of the total revenue) for oil exploration undertaken by foreign
MNCs, an American MNC, which did not agree with the rate, decided to
stop its drilling operation. This particular situation in Malaysia
generated heated arguments between company and government officials,
which also affected other multinationals. In response to a company's
reaction to the Malaysian petroleum policy, Mr. Razaleigh, then the
Chairman of the government-owned petroleum company, said,
"We are prepared to listen to reason, not threats.. .Petronas
will (government-owned company) not submit to threats of pulling
out "huge investments" from Malaysia. . .they must realize that the
oil belongs to this country and our people, and we will not allow
them to take all our wealth away."*
PREFERENCE FOR CLARITY IN THE GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES
Our Interviews also revealed that the American MNCs found It diffi-
cult to operate with vague and diffuse policies. As the top executive
of an American petroleum company in Singapore explained:
"What is important to us Is not what the rules of the game
are, but their consistency. We can operate under strict controls,
*New Strait Times (Malaysia), June 27, 1975.
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or no controls at all... but what is terribly difficult is when
you gear your approach to certain markets and, all of a sudden,
more controls are slapped on overnight, or when you had a tightly
controlled situation, and the controls are taken off."
Such preferences for clarity and consistency in policies are
natural, and they do make life easier for the multinationals. However,
uncertainties and changes are a fact of life, particularly in inter-
national business and by and large, American MNCs have reacted poorly
to changes in their environment.
The Japanese, on the other hand, viewed unregulated situations as
advantageous to them; lack of specific policies meant that no specific
constraints had to be contended with. Whenever clarification was
needed, they felt, it could be gained by talking to influential persons,
government officials, bankers, and their own embassy's personnel.
To the Europeans, the existence of confused situations meant that
the world is dynamic. They also felt that if certain policies were
too restrictive currently, they would change in due course of time,
and that one should be prepared to wait out such eventual changes.
Apparently, such insistence on clarity by the U.S. multinationals
conveyed an impression of stubbornness and inflexibility to host-
government officials, whose own socio-cultural background made them
tolerant of vagueness.
PERSONNEL POLICIES
AMERICAN MNCs 1 PRACTICES
The personnel policies as well as the overall management system of
American MNCs have been acclaimed as most advanced and sophisticated.
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This was acknowledged not only by host-government officials, educators,
and union leaders, but also by executives of the European and Japanese
multinationals themselves.
American MNCs have been regarded as fair and equitable in dealing
with their employees in terms of providing attractive wages and
salaries, fringe benefits, training, and promotion opportunities.
Because of such enlightened personnel policies, other industrial and
commercial enterprises, including European and Japanese MNCs, have
experienced difficulties in attracting and retaining high-level man-
power in the developing countries.
American MNCs were also the first to deal with the widespread
demand of the developing countries to localize management of foreign
companies. In our earlier study of 56 U.S. subsidiaries in six deve-
loping countries (Negandhi, 1975), we found no more than two dozens
expatriate American managers in these companies. In the present study,
we noted the continuation of this trend in the declining use of ex-
patriate managers by U.S. multinationals.
As shown in Table 2, the majority of the top-level executive posi-
tions in the U.S. subsidiaries were filled with local nationals. In
fact, in our study we found only one company that did not have any
national in a top-level position. In contrast, fifteen Japanese multi-
nationals (78.9%) did not employ even one single national in the top-
level management ranks. The Table indicates that European MNCs had
localized their operations considerably more than the Japanese, though
to a lesser extent than the American MNCs.
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Table 2
Extent of Localization of Top-Level Management by MNCs
LOCALIZATION MNC OWNERSHIP
OF TOP-LEVEL U.S. EUROPEAN JAPANESE
MANAGEMENT (n = 44) (n = 33) (n = 19)
n/% n/% n/%
100 12/27.3 3/9.1 0/0
75-99 14/31.8 13/39.4 0/0
51-74 7/15.9 4/12.1 2/10.5
1-50 10/22.7 8/24.2 2/10.5
1/2.3 5/15.2 15/78.9
CHI SQUARE = 53.03
D.F. = 8
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE =0.01
Source: Authors 1 interviews.
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Our study also indicates that Japanese multinationals are parti-
cularly likely to employ Japanese personnel, even low down the organi-
zational ladder, despite the availability of skilled and competent
personnel in the host country. It was not uncommon in Japanese multi-
nationals to find that their first-line supervisors were Japanese
nationals. Such practices contributed quite significantly to the
operational-level problems with which the Japanese multinationals were
plagued.
EUROPEAN MNCs' PRACTICES
In recent years, European MNCs have made considerable strides
in catching up with the Americans with respect to their management
systems and personnel policies. Although there are still subtle dif-
ferences between the basic orientations, management philosophy and
practices of American and European companies, the gap between the two
with regard to their personnel policies for local employees, is fast
narrowing. Especially, at the levels of unskilled and skilled
workers, and supervisory and middle management, there are no great
differences in wages, or in type of training and promotion oppor-
tunities available. However, as we will discuss later, at the higher
technical and managerial levels, the American and European countries
are still somewhat different.
JAPANESE MNCs* PRACTICES
Among the multinationals we studied, the Japanese seem to have
the most severe problem with their employees. They experienced the
greatest difficulty in attracting, retaining, and motivating employees
at all levels. Generally, the Japanese MNCs followed two distinctive
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modes in their personnel policies. The one was to practice the
Japanese style of management. Here, they would attempt to introduce
the Japanese practice of life-time employment and promotion on the
basis of seniority, and demand complete employee loyalty to the com-
pany. The other mode was to treat the local employees in the same
manner they were treated by domestically-owned companies. This
resulted in maintenance of the status quo
,
and holding employees in
low esteem as was the custom in many local enterprises and government
agencies. However, because of rising expectations and a better under-
standing of the status of workers in other countries, these policies
have resulted in low employee morale, productivity, and higher absen-
teeism and turnover rates. (Negandhi, 1973) Although the expatriate
Japanese managers failed to see the causes of their problems, they did
admit that they had serious manpower and personnel problems in their
operations.
BACKGROUND AND CAREER PATTERNS
The American overseas manager is always on the move. Both occupa-
tional and inter-company mobility is a built-in feature of his working
life. The usual tenure of a U.S. subsidiary manager in a given posi-
tion was between three to five years. In our interviews, we found only
a handful of American expatriates who had lived in a given country more
than five years. Many of them were newcomers and were hoping that their
assignments overseas would not be a manifestation of their having been
demoted. Even those who had taken up their assignment less than a year
ago expressed the desire that they soon be transferred home again.
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In contrast, the European and Japanese managers thought of their
overseas career as a long-term one. They felt that, basically, they
were international executives, and had assumed their present positions
to strive for long-term objectives, both for their companies and for
themselves. A typical response of a Japanese expatriate manager to
the question, "Where do you go next, and when?", was:
"I came here only five years ago, and it will depend upon
that man (pointing to the picture of the president of his company),
but I came here to stay."
The response of the European executive was the same as that of the
Japanese, except that there was no picture to be pointed to. As one
German manager in Malaysia explained,
"This is not quite heaven, but it is a good place to live
and raise a family..."
Speaking on behalf of all other Europeans, he said:
"We are international executives, and we have, by choice,
decided to pursue overseas careers and, unlike Americans, for us
the question does not arise where to go next."
The U.S. is a very mobile nation, so an attitude towards an over-
seas assignment by the typical U.S. overseas manager like that described
above is both realistic and understandable. But, the contrast between
American, European, and Japanese attitudes toward and expectations in
their career goals creates an unfavorable image of the American MNCs.
Partly because of the short term of their assignments, American over-
seas managers are thought of by host officials as being 'second-rate'
executives, not given much decision-making pcwer by their headquarters.
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European and Japanese expatriates, on the other hand, are regarded as
influential and important persons, possessing high status within their
companies. Whether such a situation was true or not, in the eyes of
host-government officials and leading local businessmen, this was con-
sidered to be a fact. Frequently, government officials in developing
countries have demanded that U.S. subsidiaries call in their vice-
presidents or presidents for even minor discussions, thus implying
that expatriate managers are not considered important enough in the
management hierarchy, or lack sufficient influence or authority to
make important decisions.
Significant differences were also observed in the background and
training of U.S., European, and Japanese executives. As one would
expect, a large majority of the expatriates interviewed were college
graduates. However, the nature of their studies differed considerably.
Approximately two-thirds of the American expatriates were either busi-
ness and/or engineering majors. A large majority of Japanese expa-
triates specialized in international economics and social science. A
larger number of the European managers, on the other hand, took their
degree in the humanities and liberal arts.
With respect to the American overseas manager, more than a decade
ago, we found, in another large-scale study, that over 50Z of the gra-
duates were business or engineering majors, with approximately 44Z from
the humanities and liberal arts. (Gonzalez and Negandhi, 1967) More
recently, however, greater emphasis is being placed on business admini-
stration education. This is quite evident from the survey of Fortune's
500 chief executives. The study reports that "more than half of today's
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top officers majored either in business or economics, and more than a
quarter studied in graduate school." (Burk, 1967:176)
In contrast, earlier studies by Newcomer (1950) and Warner and
Abegglen (1955), it was found that less than one-third were business
graduates. The Fortune survey also reports an increasing trend toward
legal and financial training among top executives. The survey states:
"The expanding size and complexity of corporate organiza-
tions, coupled with their continued expansion overseas, have
increased the importance of financial planning and controls.
And the growth of government regulation and obligations com-
panies face under law has heightened the need for legal advice.
The engineer and the production man have become. . .less important
in management than the finance man and the lawyer." (Burk, 1967:
177)
Our interview, however, indicated that such a trend, while true
for high-level corporate officials, has not yet penetrated to the
level of managers of subsidiaries in the developing countries. The
emphasis, here, is on the "nuts and bolts" part of the business like
bottom-line profits, internal efficiency and productivity. As men-
tioned earlier, these executives do not devote sufficient time to
interface relationships. (Boddewyn and Kapoor, 1972)
In contrast to such training received by American expatriate mana-
gers, European and Japanese managars, both in their formal education
and in in-company training, are indoctrinated to be sensitive to the
demands of the external environment. They are very much concerned
with the 'positioning' of their organizations in such a way that they
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do not "stick out like a sore thumb." (Franko, 1976:220-225) As we
discussed earlier, their primary concern was to adapt to the socio-
cultural environment while the American executives perceived themselves
as 'change agents'. The Americans usually found the socio-economic and
political environments in the developing countries hostile and not con-
ducive to the private enterprise system.
THE AMERICAN DILEMMA
In spite of the proven superiority of American management prac-
tices, and despite the efforts to localize U.S. overseas operations,
the personnel policies of the American MNCs are being increasingly
criticized by their own employees and by government officials. The
apparent slowness of European and Japanese MNCs in placing local
nationals in responsible positions has, however, been overlooked by
the host governments. Why so?
Host-government officials, as well as top-level local employees
interviewed, felt that while American companies have responded to the
desire of host governments for more local managers, they have merely
followed the letter of the law and not the spirit. In localizing over-
seas operations, the critics contend, they have not only withheld
decision-making powers from local nationals, but also from the remaining
expatriate managers. It was also frequently pointed out to us by
government officials that the quality of American expatriate managers
was "inferior" to their European and Japanese counterparts. Common
expressions of host government officials we talked to were:
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- "Americans cannot make decisions..."
- "They are too inflexible..."
- "They do not have enough power..."
A most illustrative and striking example of such an evaluation on
the part of host-government officials of American expatriates, was
reflected in the public demand of a senior Malaysian governmental
official that the president or vice-president of a company come from
the United States to discuss some problems. Until that time, the
official had declined to grant even a courtesy appointment to the sub-
sidiary manager.
Simultaneously, the presence of a sizeable number of expatriates
in the European and Japanese MNCs appears to have been conceived by
the host countries in generally positive terms. They have been cre-
dited by the host government as possessing substantial decision-making
power, and being more flexible in their attitudes than the Americans.
They are also regarded as having closer ties with their headquarters,
and even the ability to influence major decisions affecting subsidiary
operations.
Thus, it seems to us that the localization of management by
American MNCs has turned out to be a disadvantage for the U.S. com-
panies. Some of the American expatriate managers interviewed felt
that it was a mistake on the part of their companies to do so. As
one American in Thailand said:
"We should not have done it in the first place, but now we
do not know how to go back and bring more expatriate managers...
European and Japanese are smart... they have not gone too far in
this respect."
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HEADQUARTER-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS
In order to obtain a better understanding of the problems facing
the executives of American subsidiaries, we attempted to explore
various facets of headquarter-subsidiary relationships and their
impact on MNC (subsidiary)-host-country relationships.
Interviews with American executives indicated that they felt
strongly about their inability to participate in decision-making.
Many of them admitted that they were little more than "peons" in terms
of their head-office hierarchy, and that communication between them
and the head offices* bosses were strictly formal and minimal In
nature. At the same time, many of these executives complained a great
deal about the excessive demands made by their head-offices for reports
and data on subsidiary operations. They felt that these reports and
data were for the entertainment of the "computer men" and, as one
American executive in Thailand put it,
"For these whiz kids who are playing around with the figures
but really don't know what to do with the data... [The] more you
supply, [the] more they want... and my two (expatriate) assistants
and I spend sixty percent of our time in generating reports and
data, and I surely hope somebody is using them at least as toilet
paper."
In a similar vein, another American expatriate, who had been posted
to India after twenty-five years of service at the home office, said:
"Headquarters demand a lot of documentation from here... (but)
as far as top brass is concerned, they seem to know very little
about what is happening in these countries."
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Explaining his relationship with the home-office, he pointed out,
"We leave home... take a week off to go to our headquarters...
socialize with the people we know, but communicate with nobody on
substantial matters... I sometimes wonder whether the president or
even the vice-president of our international division will recog-
nize me... They simply do not care."
Yet another American executive in Thailand echoed his frustration,
saying:
"I really question whether the top brass at the home office
listen to what we say and report... I think they are not mature
enough to know the conditions prevailing here... We are just beating
the drums, nobody cares to listen back home."
And, lastly, a returning American executive who had served for eight
years in Malaysia summed up the problems of the U.S. subsidiary-home-
office relationship. When asked about what report he would have to
file on his return regarding his experience abroad, he responded:
"I am on my way to San Franciso on my next assignment. . .They
did not call me to report at the head-office. ..If they want to
know something about the operation which I started here, they would
call me long-distance. . .Hell, they do not need me... they know it
all!"
In contrast to such apparent tension and misgivings between the
U.S. subsidiaries' managers and their head-offices, the European and
Japanese managers felt very comfortable In their relationship with
their head-offices. Although there was relatively much less formal
reporting to be found in the European and Japanese MNCs, the overseas

-35-
managers felt that they were involved In and informed about the major
strategic decisions undertaken back home, and their own voices and
viewpoints were seriously considered during the formulation of major
policies affecting their operations. They also felt they had con-
siderable latitude in running their operations. In this respect, most
of the American expatriate managers we interviewed felt that their
role and duties were very narrowly defined; they were simply just
another cog in the corporate machine.
The foregoing rather rosy picture of European and Japanese over-
seas managers does not necessarily mean that they did not experience
any tension and conflict in dealing with their home-office personnel.
Yoshino's study (1975), for example, shows the existence of tension
and certain levels of conflict between the Japanese subsidiary and the
home-office. He ascribes this tension to the unique decision-making
system that the Japanese employ. This "bottom-up" decision-making
system is known in Japan as the "Ring!" system. In underscoring the
practical limitations of this system, Yoshino states:
"Japanese have extended the Ring! system of decision-making
to international operations with virtually no alterations...
(However) the extension of the Ringi system... has several immediate
as well as long-range implications. . .First.. .it has created some
practical difficulties for the management of foreign subsidiaries,
because it is they who must, somehow, bridge the gap that Is created
by their physical operation and Isolation from the parent company.
This diverts their attention from the pressing needs of management
of the local enterprise and is often a great source of frustration
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for them. Furthermore, the decision process can be extremely time-
consuming when circumstances require rapid responses..
.
[The] long-
term implications of extending the Ringi system... are that it makes
the participation of non-Japanese nationals in the decision-making
process extremely difficult. (Yoshino, 1975:163)
In criticizing this type of decision-making system used in Japanese
multinationals' overseas operations, Yoshino further states,
"Japanese management is a closed, local, exclusive, and
highly culture-bound system, and the Ringi system epitomizes it...
Compared with the Japanese, the American system Is less culture-
bound, has greater flexibility, and has a considerable degree of
tolerance for heterogeneous elements." (1975:164-165)
Yoshino' s description of the Japanese decision-making system is
illuminating. However, in our opinion, he has failed to differentiate
between the problems created at operation levels, and those at inter-
face levels.
The Japanese do face a great number of operational problems; this
may be due to their particular management orientation, including the
Ringi system of decision-making. However, such an orientation has not
created problems for them in dealing with the governmental officials
in host countries. As indicated earlier, the officials Interviewed by
us felt that the Japanese managers were much more flexible and had more
decision-making power than the Americans.
The American system of management was much more advanced, and also
preferred by employees. But the lack of self-esteem of the managers,
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coupled with their restricted decision-making power and a lack of ade-
quate communication between the subsidiary and its home-office has
caused a large number of interface problems for American MNCs.
The European multinationals overseas appear to be in the best posi-
tion. Unlike the Japanese, they were not found to be experiencing major
operational problems. Although their management system may not be as
sophisticated as the American MNCs', they are not far behind. Our
studies in a number of developing countries indicate that local people
would generally rather work for American than European MNCs, owing to
their higher wages, better training, and promotion opportunities.
(Negandhi and Prasad, 1971, Chs: 7,8) However, once the qualified
employees reach higher management positions in U.S. subsidiaries, they
seem to be frustrated with their lack of decision-making power and the
excessive reporting requirements of their home-offices. At this
stage, the most able and qualified local employees in the American
subsidiaries seek alternative opportunities, either in large local
enterprises or in governmental agencies. However, there has not been
a massive exodus.
In contrast, the European MNCs do not create initially such high
expectations among their local employees, but they do promise better
job security and a more stable career path. Local nationals do not
appear to have as good a chance of reaching top positions in European
operations, but at the lower positions they are made to feel important
and wanted. Such a feeling of being "wanted" is lacking in the
American subsidiaries.
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There is little substantial difference between U.S. and European
MNCs with regard to their interface conflicts. However, our inter-
views clearly showed that Europeans have learned to adapt better to
changing circumstances. In fact, it would not be foolhardy to predict
that European multinationals in the years to come, will experience
less conflict than those from the U.S. (provided that present trends
continue), since their flirtation with U.S. management practices seems
to be on the wane. (Heller and Willat, 1975)
INVESTMENT POLICY AND STRATEGIES
The U.S., European, and Japanese multinationals all desire to have
one hundred percent equity holding in their subsidiaries. However,
Europeans and Japanese appear to have reconciled themselves (Franko,
1976:121-130) to the leverage possessed by host governments, and have
more readily accepted majority or even minority (especially the
Japanese) positions. American MNCs, however, have often made threats
of divestiture in order to retain one hundred percent equity. Such an
attitude has begun to hurt U.S. MNCs. Because of their insistence on
one hundred percent equity, some host governments are bypassing them
whenever large-scale projects have to be developed in the public sec-
tor.
Furthermore, U.S. MNCs appear to be reluctant to enter Into fields
in which they do not possess the necessary know-how. Acquisition of
know-how through partnership with some other American firm is generally
not pursued. There is a great concern with the notion of internal
efficiency, expressed, for example, in a strong desire to build plants
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that achieve economies of scale. In contrast to these American policies,
the Japanese have an investment policy that is very flexible. If they
had to, they would even settle for minority equity holding, or go into
partnership with others, including Japanese trading companies, other
Japanese investors, local investors, as well as governmental enter-
prises. Usually, Japanese overseas investment was undertaken by a
large trading company, which coordinated its efforts with other firms
(generally Japanese) possessing the requisite know-how. In a sense,
Japanese trading companies serve as catalysts for Japanese manufacturing
investment in Southeast Asia, as well as in Latin America.
Despite the frequency of minority equity holding, a significant
proportion of Japanese firms nevertheless manage to retain management
control through use of various sub-agreements with respect to raw
materials, spare parts, disposal of the end-products, etc. The
Japanese were also willing to spread their investment over diverse
operations. In other words, their limited amount of capital invest-
ment was channeled into a number of activities, both to minimize risk,
and to demonstrate the flexibility to the host country. When ques-
tioned by host governments about their contribution toward socio-
economic development, they would point out the extensiveness of their
involvement and investment, their impact on employment generation, and
the variety of products they were manufacturing. In this way, they
would stress their intense concern for the socio-economic development
of the host country. However, when the multinationals came under fire,
they would disappear from public view and take an extremely low pro-
file, saying,
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"We are not big... we are not multinationals. . .we have only
small equity holdings, as required by host governments."
In our interviews, large trading companies like Mitsui, Marubeni,
Mitsubishi, and others, doing busines in the range of 250 to 400
million dollars per year in a given country, claimed that they were
not multinationals, while much smaller American manufacturing com-
panies with investments of less than $50,000 would widely advertise
their international stature. (Franko, 1976:218-219; Heller and
Willat, 1975:219) To cite a typical example, a Japanese company
operating in Thailand, with an investment of no more than one million
dollars, managed to control four textile companies, three steel mills,
one food company, one large trading company, and ten other companies
with products ranging from tissue paper to metal fabrications. The
sales volume of this firm was about 450 million (U.S.) dollars per
year; and it claimed to provide employment for 10,000 locals. In the
same country, a typical American investor would invest about one and
a half million dollars in a single plant providing employment for
approximately 300 to 400 employees. Nevertheless, the American com-
pany would maintain a high profile while the Japanese firm would be
barely noticeable.
As indicated earlier, we found that the Japanese investor was
willing to enter into areas in which his company currently lacked the
know-how. In other words, the possession of a particular technique or
product was not the criterion for overseas investment. In fact, it
was the other way around. Japanese multinationals were generally very
receptive to whatever the host government wanted to be done. When the
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negotiating firm did not possess a technique, it would invite other
Japanese or foreign investors to join. The Japanese also showed a
willingness to enter into innovative terms of agreement. Such agree-
ments might include provision of technology and know-how in return for
long-term raw material supplies, or end-products for Japanese, European,
and American markets.
The European mode of investment fits in between that of the U.S.
and the Japanese. The European strategy was one of diversification.
However, the Europeans generally preferred to retain a larger propor-
tion of equity than did the Japanese, though their insistence on a
one-hundred percent equity position was not as great as the Americans.
Also, the Europeans were not necessarily against entering into joint
ventures with host governments. (Franko, 1976:121-130)
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